Hashimoto, H.（橋本博文）, Mifune, N.（三船恒裕）, & Yamagishi, T.（山岸俊男） (2014). To be perceived as altruistic: Strategic considerations that support fair behavior in the dictator game. 利他敵と認知されること：独裁者ゲームでの公正行動を支える戦略的基盤 Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral Science, 5(2), 17-20.
We successfully replicated Dana, Cain, and Dawes’ study (2006) using a dictator game with an exit option with a Japanese sample. The exit option allowed the dictator to leave the recipient with nothing by paying a small fee, while also ensuring that the recipient never noticed that the dictator game was being played. If the dictator was motivated by fairness, or even self-interest, there would be no reason to choose the exit option. However, our study, as well as the original study, demonstrated that approximately 40% of participants chose the exit option. Based on these results, we argue that the altruistic behavior exhibited during the standard dictator game represents a default strategy for reputation management.